Since anonymous agents can spread misinformation with impunity, many people advocate for greater accountability for internet speech. This paper provides a veritistic argument that accountability mechanisms can cause significant epistemic problems for internet encyclopedias and social media communities. I show that accountability mechanisms can undermine both the dissemination of true beliefs and the detection of error. Drawing on social psychology and behavioral economics, I suggest alternative mechanisms for increasing the trustworthiness of internet communication.
Introduction
Internet anonymity can encourage people to act in bad faith. For epistemologists, this raises concerns about the trustworthiness of internet communication. If anonymity makes it easy for agents to lie, makes it difficult for audiences to judge the competence of speakers, and prevents us from providing real-world punishments for those who undermine epistemic practices, then, so this concern goes, the internet provides a poor medium for the production and dissemination of knowledge. Wikipedia vandalism, Twitter pranks, and hoax blogs are now 1 I thank P. D. Magnus, Ben Almassi, the works-in-progress group at Hobart & William Smith, and an anonymous reviewer for Episteme for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. familiar features of our online lives. Recent cases of a corporation removing unflattering information from its Wikipedia pages, a Twitterer spreading the false rumor of flooding in the New York Stock Exchange during hurricane Sandy, and a fake blog on the Syrian uprising all heighten worries about the epistemic merit of internet communication (Borland 2007; Bell & Flock 2011; Kaczynski 2012) .
A common response to these abuses maintains that the early ideals of a free and open internet were naïve-now that we see the tendency for abuse, mechanisms of accountability are necessary to ensure the epistemic value of internet communities. Some critics advocate for criminal and civil penalties for Twitterers who spread misinformation (Kaczynski 2012; Keen 2012) . Others propose publicly naming and shaming Wikipedia vandals (Borland 2007 ). In addition, Alvin Goldman suggests that since many bloggers are not accountable to employers, blogging has less epistemic value than traditional journalism, in which journalists are motivated to keep their jobs (Goldman 2008: 121) . These responses share the assumption that accountability is what is lacking, i.e., stronger systems of accountability would enhance the internet's epistemic status. This paper challenges this assumption.
While the benefits of accountability mechanisms are often discussed, their problems are largely ignored in social epistemology. I argue that there are several veritistic problems with internet accountability mechanisms. But my claim is not that accountability has no epistemic value. Much depends on the particularities of online communities. Further empirical research is needed on the effects of various accountability mechanisms. This paper lays out veritistic considerations that should be investigated before an accountability approach is advocated. I show that accountability mechanisms can both damage epistemic communities' ability to disseminate true beliefs and undermine their ability to weed out error.
Alternatives to accountability mechanisms are also neglected in social epistemology.
Recent studies in social psychology and behavioral economics not only challenge the basic assumptions of the Homo economicus model behind accountability approaches to trustworthiness, but these experimental results also suggest alternative methods for promoting trustworthy behavior. Drawing on these methods for engaging users' pro-social and ethical motivations, I propose strategies to increase internet trustworthiness and enhance the epistemic value of internet communication.
I begin by defining terminology, delimiting the scope of my argument, and (in section 2) introducing the veritistic social epistemology that provides my evaluative framework. Section 3 outlines veritistic concerns about internet anonymity. In sections 4 and 5, I discuss two leading methods for holding people's real-world selves accountable for the behavior of their online personas. I show that each method has significant epistemic problems. Section 6 concludes by drawing on experimental work in social psychology and behavioral economics to suggest ways that internet accountability could be modified and supplemented to avoid these pitfalls.
Preliminary distinctions and scope of the argument
I take anonymity to be a relation of noncoordinatability of traits, such that aspects of an anonymous person's identity are not coordinatable with traits known to others (Wallace 1999: 23) . Anonymity thus encompasses pseudonymity, and a user can be anonymous even though she may have a comprehensive and accurate online pseudonymous identity (when the pseudonym prevents others from coordinating the online persona's traits known to them with aspects of the real-world identity, such as the real-world name). While many other media allow for anonymous communication, internet anonymity has particularly epistemically powerful and challenging features. First, unlike anonymous graffiti, anonymous online messages can reach large-scale audiences, be easily posted from afar, are searchable and reproducible, and are difficult to erase permanently (Levmore 2010: 53) . Second, unlike newspaper articles published without an author's name, there is often no intermediary or responsible authority (e.g. an editor) who is held accountable for online speech. Given the ease with which many can post permanent and widelyaccessible online messages with impunity, it is unsurprising that many argue for greater accountability for internet speech.
However, this paper argues that accountability mechanisms can damage the epistemic status of internet communities. I focus on two types of internet communities: wiki-style encyclopedia communities and social media communities. Much philosophical discussion of internet epistemology analyzes encyclopedias, such as Wikipedia, where users write and edit the articles (cf. de Laat 2012a de Laat , 2012b Magnus 2009; Matthews and Simon 2012; Sanger 2009; Simon 2010; Tollefsen 2009; Wray 2009 ). My analysis of problems with accountability in these communities challenges common philosophical approaches to internet epistemology. I also analyze social media communities, since blogs, Twitter, and Facebook are growing in both social influence and philosophical interest (cf. de Laat 2008; Goldman 2008; Coady 2011 Coady , 2012 Matthews and Simon 2012; Munn 2012; Simon 2010) . While Wikipedia and social media have many epistemic differences, analyzing the problems of accountability in these different communities uncovers some of the underlying features of internet accountability.
What do I mean by 'accountability mechanisms'? Accountability mechanisms are attempts to increase the trustworthiness of agents grounded in a Hobbesian or economic view of human nature and the solution to its ills. On this Homo economicus view, humans are selfinterested, rational, utility-maximizing agents. Under certain conditions (e.g., scarcity of resources, when such behavior garners them reputation and other valued goods, etc.), it is in the self-interest of unfettered rational egoists to engage in antisocial and untrustworthy behavior.
But punitive systems create disincentives for such antisocial behaviors. Accordingly, rational choice theorists explain why individuals act trustworthily in certain circumstances by demonstrating that trustworthiness promotes self-interest. A common rational choice strategy shows that trustworthy behavior can be expected in communities where untrustworthy behavior is likely to be detected and punished (Rescher 1989; Blais 1987; Adler 1994; Hardin 2002 ).
Mechanisms to detect and sanction untrustworthy behavior hold members accountable and provide a disincentive for betrayal. Accountability mechanisms in epistemic communities increase detection and punishment mechanisms for betraying epistemic norms (e.g., norms of honesty). This paper analyzes methods for increasing the trustworthiness of internet communication by holding people's real-world identities accountable for the actions of their online personas. This limits the scope of my discussion in two ways. First, I focus on ways to increase trustworthiness of speakers, rather than ways to increase the discriminatory abilities of readers. Any problem of deception can be approached in two ways: (i) by focusing on the speaker and attempting to make her more honest, or (ii) by focusing on the hearer and attempting to shield her from dishonesty (e.g., by filtering the information she receives) or increase her abilities to detect and reject falsehoods (e.g., by giving her more information about the trustworthiness of speakers).
2 I discuss the former approach here because accountability mechanisms aim to reduce the threat that deceptively false reports, 3 believing, will be disseminated. Thus, my discussion concerns communities of agents with imperfect discriminatory abilities in which an increase in false reports is likely to cause an increase in false beliefs. 4 Accountability mechanisms are assessed according to whether they reduce the reporting of false claims. Second, my argument is limited to mechanisms aimed at holding agents' real-world identities accountable for online behavior. Some methods of accountability aim to increase reliability by imposing various sanctions on the online personas themselves (e.g., public shaming of the online persona, or loss of esteem for the online identity) (cf. Brennan and Pettit 2008: 192) . But these methods will not be considered here. Many of the problems with holding real-world identities accountable also plague accountability for online identities, and real-world and online identities are often intertwined. But space does not permit me to address the unique problems facing punishment of online personas.
The veritistic framework
My argument that accountability mechanisms can be harmful depends on a veritistic, systems-oriented social-epistemic framework. Systems-oriented social epistemology studies the epistemology of epistemic systems, which are social systems that include "social practices, procedures, institutions, and/or patterns of interpersonal influence that affect the epistemic outcomes" of their members (Goldman 2011: 18) . Epistemic systems include formal social institutions, such as scientific or legal institutions, as well as informal or amorphous social systems, such as the blogosphere. As a normative enterprise, systems-oriented social epistemology evaluates epistemic systems according to their positive or negative epistemic 4 In communities in which the frequency of false belief is independent of the prevalence of false reports there is no veritistic reason for accountability mechanisms to reduce the number of false reports. Thus, the paper often works with the assumption that false claims will be believed to some degree, since this is the situation in which accountability mechanisms are proposed as a solution.
outcomes for members. Since it evaluates the outcomes of systems, this epistemology is consequentialist. Assessing the epistemic consequences of various social systems requires a clear specification of the epistemic goods that well-functioning epistemic systems promote. On a veritistic social epistemology, the fundamental epistemic good is true belief. 5 True belief is not only intrinsically valuable, but it is also instrumentally valuable for obtaining effective means to achieve our ends.
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It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss and evaluate all possible versions of veritism (e.g. egalitarian veritism in which the true beliefs of all agents carry equal value vs.
elitist veritism in which the true beliefs of some agents are more valuable). In general I wish to be as ecumenical as possible, to show veritists of all stripes the pitfalls of internet accountability.
However, two types of veritism must be discussed, because, as I show in sections 4 and 5, they provide different accounts of the epistemic value of diversity within epistemic communities.
Since the damage that internet accountability does to diversity will be central to my argument, I
outline these two versions of veritism: error-avoiding veritism and truth-seeking veritism (cf.
Coady 2012: 5-7).
Accordingly, this paper evaluates the impact of epistemic systems on the formation and dissemination of true beliefs within the community as a whole.
This distinction is based on William James' account of "two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion…We must know the truth; and we must avoid error" (James 2007 (James /1897 . As James notes, these duties are distinct. For example, some epistemic practices help us reject falsehoods, but they do so by leaving us in ignorance (i.e., suspended judgment), which is distinct from accepting a truth. Such practices fulfill our duty to avoid error, but they violate our 5 It is beyond the scope of this paper to address objections to the claim that true belief is of fundamental epistemic value rather than alternatives such as justified belief or consensus. See (Goldman 1999 (Goldman , 2002 Coady 2012) for veritistic evaluation of these alternatives. 6 In addition, true belief is constitutive of certain values, e.g., we value convicting the truly guilty (Goldman 1999: 75). duty to know the truth. In systems-oriented social epistemology, one may be forced to evaluate the relative epistemic merits of systems that differ only in truth-seeking and error-avoiding merits. For example, consider the relative merits of two hypothetical filtering systems, applied at different times to the same community of agents with imperfect discriminatory abilities.
Epistemic system A, which has strong filtering mechanisms, might help members avoid false beliefs (by preventing their dissemination), but it filters out so much information (including many true claims) that it leaves members in a position of greater ignorance. System A prevents members from forming false beliefs, but at the expense of leaving them with fewer true beliefs and no opinion about many claims. In contrast, epistemic system B, which has no filtering mechanisms, exposes members to a greater number of claims (many of them true, but also many of them false). System B helps members form many more true beliefs than does system A, and it leaves fewer members in a position of suspended judgment about many topics (since they are exposed to some information about the topics), but B also lacks the filtering resources to reduce error. If one makes the simplifying assumption that the beliefs under consideration are of equal interest and value along other dimensions, then in evaluating the relative epistemic merits of these two systems, the social epistemologist must determine which is of greater epistemic value:
error avoidance or truth attainment.
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Error-avoiding veritists prioritize avoiding false belief, while truth-seeking veritists prioritize attaining true belief. Distinguishing between error-avoidance and truth-attainment is crucial in recent discussions on internet epistemology. Goldman (2008) argues that the veritistic value of traditional media surpasses that of the blogosphere, in part, because the traditional media are superior at filtering out false claims-traditional reporters' practices "reduce the number of errors that might otherwise be reported and believed" (Goldman 2008: 117) . David Coady (2011 Coady ( , 2012 counters that Goldman's argument is inadequate to prove the superiority of traditional media. Coady argues that Goldman fails to provide empirical evidence that the blogosphere causes more false beliefs than do traditional media. But Coady also maintains that, "even if it were true that the blogosphere leads people to believe more falsehoods than they otherwise would, it would not follow that its overall impact on them would be harmful, even from a narrowly epistemic point of view" (Coady 2012: 160) . Coady reminds us that erroravoidance and truth-attainment are distinct epistemic goals that may come into conflict: "People who confine themselves to a filtered medium may well avoid believing falsehoods (if the filters are working well), but inevitably they will also miss out on valuable knowledge" (Coady 2012: 161) . Even if it were true that the blogosphere causes more false beliefs than the traditional media, it might still have the epistemic virtue of causing many true beliefs. Thus, a truth-seeking veritist might remain unconvinced by Goldman's argument for the epistemic inferiority of the blogosphere. Having illustrated the two versions of veritism, I take no side in this debate on the blogosphere, nor the debate between truth-seeking and error-avoiding veritists; instead, sections 4 and 5 show that both types of veritist have reason to be concerned about internet accountability.
Veritistic concerns about internet anonymity
Veritists have reason to be concerned that internet anonymity facilitates error dissemination. Anonymity protects agents' real-world identities from sanction for the actions of their online personas. Tricksters, trolls, vandals, corporations, and special interest groups, emboldened by this protection, can spread falsehoods for fun, harm, self-promotion, spinning information, or political gain. Internet encyclopedias have been the victims of such attempts to spread misinformation (Borland 2007) . While the reliability of Wikipedia entries rates favorably compared to other encyclopedias such as the Encyclopedia Britannica (Giles 2005) , it is also vulnerable to vandalism, since anyone can anonymously edit most 8 entries. In one study, it was found that only 4% of all edits to Wikipedia pages were cases of vandalism (Wikipedia contributors 'Counter-Vandalism'). However, anonymity appears to facilitate vandalism, since 97% of the vandalizing edits were made by anonymous users (ibid.). LGBT life in Syria. Additionally, the exposure of the hoax provided an opportunity for the Assad regime to perpetuate the conspiracy theory that the Syrian uprising is a foreign intervention in Syrian politics, rather than a citizen revolution (Abbas and Boundaoui 2011) .
Finally, following exposure of the hoax, the credibility of all uses of social media by Middle
Eastern activists was thrown into dispute (Abbas 2011) . Thus, the hoax may have undermined trust in many legitimate activists, thus undermining their ability to communicate true claims about the Arab Spring. In all these ways, MacMaster's abuse of the anonymity provided by social media shows that veritists have good reason to fear for the veritistic value of the internet.
It is not surprising, therefore, that each time there is a highly publicized internet hoax or case of Wikipedia vandalism, there are calls for greater internet accountability as a solution, on the grounds that the threat of punishment for online dishonesty might deter some of these abuses. In sections 4 and 5, I outline two methods of internet accountability, and I argue that each has significant veritistic problems.
4. Accountability mechanism 1: Require identified communication (i.e., abandon anonymity)
Abandoning anonymity is one way to increase internet accountability and protect the trustworthiness of internet communication. This involves replacing anonymous systems with systems that prompt users to interact using real-world identities. While this would be a significant change to many internet communities, a number of existing mechanisms could be used. Several internet wiki encyclopedias require editors to adopt real-name user identities (e.g., Citizendium, Scholarpedia). Accountability concerns are explicitly listed as one of the reasons for Citizendium's real-names policy: "people do tend to behave themselves better when their identities are known and their behavior is out in the open, and good behavior is crucial to a smoothly running knowledge community" (Citizendium contributors 'Why Real Names?').
Similarly, blog moderators can require that commenters sign their comments, and they can delete or refuse to post comments by anonymous commenters. While these strategies can push many community members to non-anonymous participation, the possibility often remains that someone can provide a fake identity, if there are no additional verification mechanisms. To avoid this problem, Twitter has some verified accounts (usually of celebrities and other influential figures)
for which the organization has confirmed the user's real-world identity (Twitter 'FAQs').
While abandoning anonymity may increase the reliability of content shared by users afraid to sully their real-world identities, there are epistemic benefits of anonymity that are lost.
First, some experimental evidence indicates that anonymity in computer-mediated discussion increases the quantity and novelty of ideas shared (Connolly, Jessup, and Valacich 1990) . While the precise reasons for these results are unclear, the authors speculate that all of us feel some degree of social inhibition when our comments are linked to our identities (ibid.: 699).
Anonymity enables us to more freely contribute our epistemic resources. This provides an argument from truth-seeking veritism against accountability mechanisms that remove anonymity. Removal of anonymity could deprive the community of true beliefs spread by reports from socially threatened groups. Without online anonymity, activists, citizen journalists, and members of many socially stigmatized groups are much less likely to take the risk of sharing what they know with others. Thus, the decrease in threatened groups' participation in epistemic communities is a second problem with removing anonymity.
Abandoning anonymity can decrease the diversity of epistemic communities.
At this point, one might wonder whether my argument will only be persuasive to truthseeking veritists. An objector might claim that I am rejecting the main mechanism for preventing people from adopting false beliefs (i.e., preventing the dissemination of falsehoods by the deterrent of accountability mechanisms) in order to maintain a system that allows us to form more true beliefs. But what about error-avoiding veritism? If forced to choose between an epistemic system that prevents agents from believing falsehoods but leaves them in a position of suspended judgment (ignorance) on many subjects, and an epistemic system that facilitates the formation of beliefs but does not weed out falsehoods, error-avoiding veritists will choose the former.
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10 More precisely, which system error-avoiding veritists will accord more epistemic value depends on both the weight to which they assign true and false beliefs as well as the number of true and false beliefs promoted by the systems. Only the strictest error-avoiding epistemologists will place all epistemic value on error-avoidance and accord no weight to the adoption of true beliefs. Thus, error-avoiding veritists will vary based on the weights they assign to truth acquisition and error-avoidance. However, what unites them is that there exists some number of false beliefs promoted by an epistemic system that cannot be outweighed by the value of removing ignorance.
If the decision whether to remove anonymity is such a forced choice, then erroravoiding veritists will ceteris paribus prefer the accountability mechanism, even though it has the pitfall of preventing the dissemination of true beliefs. Thus, to show that error-avoiding veritists also have reason to be wary of the removal of anonymity, I argue that this forced choice is rare. In other words, anonymity facilitates error detection as well as truth attainment.
Accordingly, a third problem with requiring identified communication is that anonymity can enhance error-detection by enabling increased transformative criticism to weed out error and bias. Feminist empiricist epistemologists have long argued that critical dialogue within diverse epistemic communities facilitates the uncovering and removal of bias (e.g., Longino 1990 Longino , 2002 Anderson 1995; Intemann 2010) . In scientific communities, diversity is epistemically valuable because biased background assumptions can be uncovered when research is subjected to conceptual and evidential criticism from scientists with diverse values, interests, and social identities. If the scientific community promotes such critical engagement within a diverse community, and if criticisms of bias are taken up, then the knowledge circulating in the community can become more objective (Longino 1990: 73-74) . As Goldman notes, this feminist argument can be given a veritistic interpretation (Goldman 1999 : 78)-critical discussion within diverse epistemic communities is an effective mechanism for error detection. Insofar as online anonymity promotes diversity within online communities, it can facilitate error detection. In contrast to the truth-seeking veritistic argument that anonymity has epistemic merit because it encourages threatened groups to share true reports that can spread true beliefs to others, the error-avoiding veritistic argument maintains that anonymity enables such groups to share criticisms of false beliefs. These criticisms can lead community members to reject or suspend judgment on false claims.
Blogging and tweeting are not simply means of disseminating knowledge claims; they are also means of challenging, criticizing, and uncovering errors in others' knowledge claims.
Similarly, Wikipedians do not simply post and edit entries, they use the 'Talk' page of encyclopedia entries to challenge content and debate bias in the articles. Thus social media and
Wikipedia provide ample opportunities for transformative criticism. The error-uncovering efficacy of such criticism is enhanced by the anonymity that facilitates participation by diverse groups who would otherwise, for fear of sanction, not join the discussion. Removing anonymity risks silencing their valuable criticisms.
The previous three arguments defending internet anonymity focused on anonymity's role in enabling threatened groups to share true reports and criticisms. A fourth argument emphasizes anonymity's role in ensuring that these reports and criticisms are given due epistemic authority.
As recent work on epistemic injustice has shown, prejudice causes socially oppressed groups to be given less epistemic authority than they deserve (Fricker 2007) . This is veritistically undesirable, since such groups make valuable reports and criticisms that merit uptake.
Consider testimonial injustice: a speaker sustains a testimonial injustice iff "she receives a credibility deficit owing to identity prejudice in the hearer" (Fricker 2007: 28) . When a hearer's prejudicial stereotypes cause her to grant the speaker's testimony less credibility than would have been granted in the absence of prejudice, the speaker suffers an injustice because she is undermined in her capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007: 44; 2011: 67) . The community also suffers, since the knowledge the speaker attempted to convey does not receive appropriate uptake (Fricker 2007: 43 In sum, my initial arguments showed that abandoning anonymity can undermine the sharing of true beliefs and the detection of false beliefs by decreasing the epistemic activity of threatened epistemic agents. While those arguments were based on the premise that such groups will participate less in non-anonymous epistemic communities, this fourth argument maintains that their participation will, without anonymity, be given less epistemic authority than it deserves. Anonymity, thus, has veritistic benefits when it facilitates the dissemination and uptake of knowledge that would otherwise be lost to the community.
But what of the bad behavior facilitated by anonymity? One might argue that anonymity provides no net benefit through the mechanisms I have described, because while it can encourage marginalized groups to participate in epistemic communities and have their claims taken seriously, it also simultaneously encourages attacks on them. Bad faith actors, emboldened by the safety of anonymity, can spread prejudice and hate speech, making online communities hostile environments for oppressed groups. Hate speech and harassment of oppressed groups can cause them to leave epistemic communities or to stay but internalize the attacks and lose confidence in their contributions (Anderson 1995: 201) . It also spreads prejudice, further entrenching problems of testimonial injustice. Thus, anonymity may provide no net increase in the participation of oppressed groups in internet communities and no net increase in their epistemic activity being given due credit. Thus, on this objection, there is no clear veritistic argument, along the lines I have suggested, in favor of internet anonymity.
In response, I grant that, in the absence of norms of civility, anonymity may have no net epistemic benefit. However, this should be taken as an argument for internet norms of civility, rather than an argument against anonymity. When internet communities are set up to prevent hate speech and harassment of oppressed groups, the problems outlined in the objection are not as pressing. A variety of mechanisms for preventing hate speech and harassment exist, including the clear articulation of norms of civil dialogue and the institution of reporting mechanisms so that harassing speech is flagged for removal by a moderator. 14 This is not to say that ensuring a welcoming internet community for marginalized groups is easy, but steps can be taken to diminish internet harassment without removing the anonymity that provides protection to vulnerable groups.
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Given the veritistic problems with requiring identified communication, it is perhaps fortunate that Wikipedia and many social media spaces have not completely removed anonymity.
That said, other mechanisms exist for holding people's real-world selves accountable for the activity of their online personas. The next section provides a veritistic analysis of another prominent mechanism: investigative accountability.
5. Accountability mechanism 2: Investigative accountability 14 Extreme, coordinated harassment by groups of internet attackers may be facilitated by anonymity and impervious to such anti-harassment measures (Citron 2010; Sarkeesian 2012) . If coordinated harassment becomes an overwhelming problem for oppressed groups, then anonymity may become a net epistemic detriment. 15 One might wonder whether these solutions to internet harassment simply smuggle internet accountability in through the back door. Often the articulation of social norms is the first part of accountability mechanisms, as they lay out standards to which agents are held accountable. In addition, removing hate speech is one way to punish an agent for violating these standards. In response, I issue a promissory note that section 6 argues that some accountability mechanisms can be valuable if balanced with other ways of inspiring trustworthy behavior. I also provide another interpretation of codes of ethics and social norms according to which they have value beyond their function in accountability mechanisms.
While it is common to describe the internet as affording anonymity to users, it is more accurate to describe much internet activity as only potentially anonymous. This is due to the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated methods for uncovering the real-world identities behind online personas. Such investigation usually requires more effort (and expertise) than most of the general public are willing (or able) to provide. Moreover, the very existence of detection methods is often not widely known. In many cases, although someone might believe that their internet activity is anonymous, it is only anonymous as long as those with the resources and ability to investigate their real-world identity are not moved to do so.
For example, WikiScanner is a tool that enables users to identify the source of some
Wikipedia edits (Griffith 2008; Simon 2010) . Wikipedia allows people to edit pages anonymously by tagging their edits with only the IP address from which the edit was made.
WikiScanner automatically combines the database of IP addresses of Wikipedia edits with the database of the companies that own the IP addresses. Thus this tool is a boon to investigators aiming to discover who is behind edits to Wikipedia pages. A related tool by the makers of WikiScanner, the Poor Man's CheckUser, reveals the IP addresses behind some registered Wikipedians' accounts (Griffith n.d.) . This tool also facilitates investigation into the real-world identities behind Wikipedia activity. agents know that suspicious activity on their part will trigger the uncovering of their identity, then they will be less likely to spread falsehoods and engage in other epistemically harmful acts.
The investigation into the fake A Gay Girl in Damascus
The second method of accountability is, thus, to ensure trustworthiness through the threat of having one's real-world identity uncovered by investigation into suspicious online behavior.
This kind of accountability has some veritistic merit insofar as fear of exposure may inhibit some dishonest online activity-but are there any problems with it?
First, investigations are distracting, squandering scarce resources (cf. O'Neill 2002: 50) .
This accountability approach is premised on a well-functioning detection mechanism that will alert the relevant punitive agents (e.g., moderators or the public) to the existence of a bad faith actor. But detection is time and resource intensive. In the Amina case, a small army of bloggers, journalists, and activists was caught up in the hunt to uncover the blogger's identity. The sixday-long investigation ate up many hours of people's lives and much mental energy. Some of those involved recount being exhausted and losing sleep during the investigation (Henry 2011a ).
Some expressed frustration that so much attention was diverted from investigation into the real events of the Syrian uprising (Henry 2011b) . Thus, the investigative approach requires that the community sink significant time into detection practices, which means that time and resources will be diverted from other worthy epistemic aims. 17 This argument can be made by both truthseeking veritists and error-avoiding veritists-investigation diverts epistemic resources, thereby preventing the community from obtaining other valuable truths and detecting other important errors.
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Second, investigative accountability can have a dampening effect on internet speech as those who desire anonymity avoid making surprising claims that might raise the suspicions of potential investigators. Consider two of the ways we evaluate the reliability of internet content.
First, we assess internet claims by the plausibility of their content (Magnus 2009: 81) . If, in light of our background beliefs, a claim seems implausible, then we are likely to suspect it is the product of an incompetent or bad faith actor. In addition, we engage in sampling-claims that are repeated by other independent sources are regarded as more plausible than claims made by lone voices (ibid.: 82). Thus, the claims likely to raise suspicions, and thereby trigger investigations, are those that are surprising and novel. In an environment of widespread investigative accountability, the best strategy to protect one's anonymity is to avoid making novel and surprising claims. This is veritistically harmful, since novel and surprising truths are interesting in their own right (thus of particular value to truth-seeking veritists) and also 17 Note that as investigative accountability becomes easier (thereby decreasing the epistemic burden), we face the problems attendant to removing anonymity, as previously described (section 4). 18 In addition, it shows that this method of accountability potentially lacks the merits of speed and efficiency, which are important standards of social epistemic appraisal (Goldman 1992: 195-96) .
suggestive of transformative criticisms that uncover previously unrecognized errors (thereby of particular value to error-avoiding veritists) (cf. Goldman 1999: 107).
The speech of socially threatened groups is particularly susceptible to this dampening effect. Often those who most need the protection of anonymity are precisely those whose claims are most likely to be seen as novel and surprising, and hence suspicious. Anonymity protects marginalized and stigmatized minorities from retaliation and testimonial injustice. One might object that this is a poor case study on which to base my argument, since Amina and her cousin were in fact fictional. So perhaps the suspicion cast on these LGBT online identities was epistemically productive in uncovering falsehoods. But this objection misses the thrust of my argument. I do not deny that in some cases there may be epistemic benefits from investigative accountability. My aim is to show that it can also have harmful epistemic effects.
It can decrease the diversity of internet speech, thereby undermining both truth attainment and error detection. Additional empirical research is needed, and careful analysis is required before we advocate accountability solutions to the problem of internet untrustworthiness. For example, while some false beliefs were corrected by exposure of the Amina hoax, how many more true beliefs are now less likely to be produced, disseminated, and taken up as vulnerable agents withdraw from online communities for fear of exposure? Would widespread investigative accountability of bloggers and Wikipedians do more harm than good? These questions must be answered, once we recognize the possible pitfalls of internet accountability.
Where does this leave us with internet trustworthiness? I have shown that the two leading accountability mechanisms for online communities have serious epistemic problems.
While I have not shown that every conceivable accountability mechanism is epistemically damaging, I have shown that the most prominent exemplars of this approach have risks. In addition, other accountability mechanisms are likely to share some of these problems, since holding users' real-world selves accountable will generally require uncovering their real-world identity. Thus, accountability mechanisms should be carefully evaluated before implementation to determine whether their benefits (e.g., deterring untrustworthiness) outweigh their harms (e.g., distraction and less diverse online communities).
But can anything more than this be done? Can accountability mechanisms be modified to avoid their potential harms? Are there alternatives to accountability mechanisms? In the final section of the paper, I argue that not only are some modifications available, but, if we turn to behavioral economics and social psychology, we can generate a different approach to internet trustworthiness. By looking to ways to engage users' pro-social motivations, we can add another set of tools to our social-epistemic toolbox. I suggest some ways to modify and balance investigative accountability with other approaches.
6. Towards modified and balanced accountability First, there is experimental evidence that "people care not only about how much they gain from a lie, but also how much the other side loses" (Gneezy 2005; 391) . People appear less likely to lie when the lie only gives them a small benefit but does the recipient a great harm (ibid.: 385). The internet is, in many ways, an impersonal mode of interaction-users communicate with an audience that is often completely unknown to them. This may make it difficult for people to be cognizant of the damage internet dishonesty does. The experimental results suggest that making the significant harms of internet untrustworthiness more salient to users might activate the pro-social motivation to avoid doing damage to others. Of course, if a user believes that she has much to gain from dishonesty, then this particular psychological mechanism will not overcome the temptation. But I hypothesize that many cases of internet shows that of the two components of accountability mechanisms-detection and punishment-the probability of detection has a stronger deterrent effect (Nagin and Pogarsky 2003 Wikipedia Behavioral'; Twitter 'The Twitter Rules'). But one rarely encounters these codes of ethics unless one is being chastised or punished for violation. They function largely as standards to which agents are held accountable, or as policies to protect the website owners from liability.
I suggest another possible use for such policies: reminders of values that users themselves deem worthy of respect-tools for triggering users' pro-social motivations. Online communities could bring ethical prohibitions on dishonesty out from the shadows of the "about us" pages and draw users' attention to them when temptation for dishonesty arises. Such reminders of users' moral values might decrease internet dishonesty.
In conclusion, social epistemologists need ways to ensure internet trustworthiness other than accountability mechanisms. Accountability mechanisms attempt to promote trustworthiness by holding people's real-world identities liable for the behavior of their online personas. But accountability mechanisms have significant epistemic problems. Anonymity provides protection for many groups who have much of epistemic value to contribute. Removing or considerably decreasing this protection through accountability mechanisms threatens the diversity of online communities, diversity which enables communities to both obtain true beliefs and weed out errors. Investigations into real-world identities can waste epistemic resources and be biased against marginalized groups. If investigations are to be part of an epistemically fruitful community, they must be coupled with mechanisms to avoid bias. But also, we will not need to implement widespread, potentially damaging accountability mechanisms if we also pursue other mechanisms to engage users' pro-social motivations. Humans are not simply self-interested agents who can only be spurred to trustworthiness through threat of punishment. Research on the triggers for users' moral impulses suggests ways to increase the veritistic value of the internet, while avoiding the damage of excessive accountability.
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